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Modern European Philosophy 




This chapter reviews three of the most consequential works in Modern European 
Philosophy published in 2017: Étienne Balibar’s Citizen Subject, Nick Nesbitt’s edited 
volume The Concept in Crisis, and William Clare Roberts’ Marx’s Inferno. These 
works reflect the fact that 2017 witnessed an upsurge of philosophical publications 
on Marx and Marxism. On one level, this is because 2017 was simultaneously the 150-
year anniversary of the publication of the first volume of Marx’s Capital and the 100-
year anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Yet on another, more substantial level, 
these works point to the enduring question of the meaning of ‘Marxist philosophy’ in 
its dual, and disputed relationship to transformative political practice on the one 
hand, and to the history of philosophy, on the other. There are different threads that 
tie these works together, but two concepts, coming out of Louis Althusser’s work, 
stand out: those of ‘conjuncture’ and ‘symptomatic reading’. In short, this chapter 
suggests that the importance of Modern European Philosophy is in large part 
attributable to the theoretical and political problems that Marxism constitutes for it, 
problems which, at the same time, Marxism cannot articulate without this 
philosophy. The chapter is divided into five sections: 1. Introduction; 2. Writing and 
Conjuncture: Citizen Subject; 3. A Symptomatic Reading: The Concept in Crisis; 4. A 




2017 represented a series of significant anniversaries within Marxism, most notably 
the 150-year anniversary of the publication of the first volume of Marx’s Capital, and 
the 100-year anniversary of the Russian Revolution. This predictably yielded the 
publication of a number of articles, special journal issues and books reflecting on the 
political and theoretical legacies of Marx and Marxism more generally. It also brought 
to centre stage the intractable question of Marx’s contribution to modern European 
philosophy, revisiting – with renewed vigour – the question of what constitutes the 
meaning of ‘Marxist philosophy’ at a time when Marxism is still regarded as lacking 
the political relevance it once possessed. In this manner, 2017 highlights the fact that 
the confrontation between Marxism and modern European philosophy remains 
tethered, perhaps indefinitely, to the dilemmas of legacy and memory. 
 This chapter takes these anniversaries as an opportunity to pause and reflect 
on the intersections between philosophy, politics, and memory. Beyond the usual 
outflow of publications which anniversaries mechanically trigger, the question of the 
specific, conjunctural actuality of Marxism resonated with particular force last year 




that emerges from this is what, in and for philosophy, constitutes a ‘legitimate’ 
inheritance, one that does not fall into the trap of commemorative memorialisation? 
In a recent article on Walter Benjamin as a historian-archivist of the failures of the 
nineteenth-century revolutions, Rebecca Comay evocatively suggests we invert the 
famous maxim by René Char (‘Our heritage was left to us without a testament’): the 
problem would no longer be one of deficit, a lack of knowledge and the means to 
transmit the revolutionary resources of the past. (Comay, ‘Testament of the 
Revolution’, p.5) On the contrary, the question today is perhaps marked by a distinct 
surplus of testament, an excess of material which overwhelms the historical present. 
From a different angle, Enzo Traverso has recently reflected on ‘left-wing 
melancholia’ as the self-perpetuating culture of defeat which colours the emotional 
response to – and the collective guilt over – the ‘failures’ of twentieth-century social 
movements (Traverso, Left-Wing Melancholia, p. 22) Beyond the ‘landscape of 
sorrow’ (p. 19) described by Traverso, is there a dialectical possibility of renewal 
hidden in this history, one which animates new forms of philosophical production 
and, more speculatively, political action? 
 This echoes, more than half a century later, some of the questions that the 
small group of students formed around Althusser raised in their renowned 1965 
Reading Capital. At its core, Reading Capital was an attempt to revitalise what was 
perceived to be an ossified Marxism, a Marxism whose rich philosophical 
implications were stifled by the political culture of the French Communist Party 
(PCF), particularly its relation to Stalin. Their philosophical work to reactualise 
Capital took, from today’s perspective, a long but crucial detour. Indeed, it is by 
inflecting the reading of Marx with the then prominent epistemological concerns 
stemming from debates around ‘structure’, ‘history’ and ‘humanism’, that Althusser 
and his students brought out the concept of ‘conjuncture’, which names the present 
within the framework of structural causality. To think a conjuncture is to think the 
complex ‘time of times’, the specific inadequacy, the non-contemporaneity of the 
present with itself. (Pippa, ‘The necessity of contingency’, p. 21) Beyond the 
questioning of structural causality from which it emerged, the concept of 
‘conjuncture’ continues to hold crucial importance for Marxist philosophy as a whole, 
as it represents the possibility of thinking the objective articulation of theory and 
practice. Indeed, insofar as the present can be grasped as an objective totality (of 
relations of forces), can it become the locus of potential intervention. The paradox of 
Althusser, Balibar, Establet, Macherey and Rancière’s reactualisation of Capital is 
that it is by thinking Marx’s endeavour in terms of its autochthonous production of 
an epistemology adequate to its ‘object’, that the problem of actuality was reassigned 
to Marxism as a whole. Such a theoretical detour through the structural objectivity of 
the conjuncture remains pertinent to philosophical readings of Marx which seek to 
reactualise his thought, whilst avoiding the pitfalls of memorialisation or 
scholasticism. However, the relationship between politics and philosophy seems to 




of institutional Marxism, it seems that today the task is to reanimate a political Marx 
over and against the philosophical Marx of the philosophical pantheon. 
 
Writing and Conjuncture: Citizen Subject 
 
Initially published in French in 2011, Étienne Balibar’s recently translated Citizen 
Subject. Foundations for Philosophical Anthropology upholds the principle of a 
philosophy rooted in the conjuncture, developing this Althusserian legacy into the 
precept of Balibar’s own philosophical practice. As he writes in his Introduction, the 
concept of conjuncture helps us think the immanence of philosophy to history in a 
way which does not rely on either ‘context’, Zeitgeist or épistémè, but which instead 
articulates from within, textual ‘points of heresy’, with a given conjuncture: 
  
Philosophy constantly endeavors to untie and retie from the inside the knot 
between conjuncture and writing […] I hold, then, that philosophy is never 
independent of specific conjunctures. It should be clear that I use the word in 
a qualitative rather than a quantitative sense, stressing by it the very brief or 
prolonged event of a crisis, a transition, a suspense, a bifurcation, which 
manifests itself by irreversibility, i.e., in the impossibility of acting and 
thinking as before… (p. 10) 
 
Balibar pursues an immanent conception of the philosophical text. For him, nothing 
stands above the dialogic relationship between a text and its reader; ‘there is no 
metalanguage in philosophy’ (p. 11). If philosophy only exists in singular texts, it is 
also bound to specific idioms and tied up with specific conditions of utterance. As 
such, philosophy cannot disengage itself from a ‘procedure of infinite translation’ (p. 
12) in which it is always already entangled. Disjunctive syntheses and active 
‘incompletions’ (inachèvements) bestow a paradoxical unity to the ensemble of texts 
that compose this volume. 
 Balibar presents Citizen Subject as a field of hypotheses which ‘might help to 
understand the upheavals that modernity has produced in the field of philosophical 
anthropology’ (p. 1). Spanning essays on Descartes, Marx, Hegel, Locke, Rousseau, 
Freud, Derrida, Blanchot and Tolstoy, the anthology brings together studies written 
over twenty years. The book is presented as the outcome of a double project: first, to 
disentangle ‘the anthropological question in philosophy’ from the question of 
humanism, to which it has been bound since the aftermath of the 1960s’ controversy, 
starting with Althusser’s ‘anti-humanist’ injunction (p. 16); second, to rethink the 
relationship between bourgeois universalism and the anthropological question ‘at 
much deeper and more general level than the humanism debate would suggest’ (p. 
16). This means rethinking the articulation between metaphysical categories and 
political concepts. As we discover in the course of the book, this also involves a 
reflection on (social, intersubjective) relationality as articulated by Marx, Feuerbach 




construction or institutionalization of any social relation’ (p. 16). Therefore, the 
English subtitle, ‘Foundations for Philosophical Anthropology’ (the French being 
Citoyen-Sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique), might betray 
Balibar’s intention, which is not so much that of founding philosophical anthropology 
as a constituted field or ‘regulative idea’, as it is addressing ‘a critical question apropos 
of the necessary but ambivalent relation that exists between philosophical or 
sociological concepts and modern politics’ (p. 16). This project brings the Marxian 
articulation of political universality into dialogue with the critical examination of 
subjectivity in philosophy, but it also seeks to reframe the philosophical genealogy of 
the ‘subject’ from the standpoint of the dynamic conflictuality generated by claims to 
universality. The book thus rethinks two major twentieth-century philosophical 
controversies in the light of one another: the 1960s’ controversy over humanism, on 
the one hand, and what Balibar calls the new ‘querelle of universals’ (Balibar, ‘A New 
Querelle'),  on the other: the debate around universalism, politics and globalisation 
that emerged in the 1980s and that has remained pivotal to philosophy and the 
humanities since. 
 As Balibar reminds his readers, the opening chapter, ‘Citizen Subject’ was 
conceived as a response to Jean-Luc Nancy’s question ‘Who comes after the subject’?, 
and is an opportunity to glance back at the vexed problematic of the subject after and, 
as it were, at a distance from, the 1960s’ and 1970s’ ‘controversy’ of humanism. 
Rather than calling for the ‘death’ or ‘return’ of the subject, Balibar rethinks the 
subject as the site of a number of antinomies that encapsulate the modern 
constitution of what he calls ‘civic-bourgeois universality’. This means defending a 
critical genealogy of the subject and its secularization, one that sidesteps the 
emphasis on predication and substantiality (subjectus as hypokeimenon) privileged 
by Heidegger, to focus mainly on the juridical and political history of sovereignty and 
its overturns (subjectus as subditus). As with his Equaliberty: Political Essays, 
published in 2014, the starting point of Balibar’s demonstration is the 1789 
‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen’, which crystallizes the impossibility of 
thinking the newly created category of the ‘citizen’ without positing a new concept of 
‘man’, in order to justify its peculiar sovereignty. This is what Balibar calls a 
‘hyperbolic proposition’: 
          
What is new is the sovereignty of the citizen, which entails a completely 
different conception of freedom. But this sovereignty must be founded 
retroactively on a certain concept of man, or, better, in a new concept of man 
that contradicts what the term previously connoted. (p. 30) 
  
This concept of ‘man’, supposedly grounding the equality of all subjects, is in turn 
unintelligible without reference to the idea of the ‘citizen’, which in this discourse 
stands for universality itself. Thus, for Balibar, the 1789 Declaration compels us to 
imagine a paradox, that of ‘sovereign equality’ (p. 30), a sovereignty inscribed, not in 




paradox by creating a further ‘antinomy’, that of a purely immanent law: ‘in his 
capacity as “citizen”, the citizen is (indivisibly) above any law […] In his capacity as 
“subject” he is necessarily under the law […]’ (p. 33). But this equation of the law 
remains purely formal, and proves untenable as soon as it appears that ‘governing’ 
and ‘law-making’ are not, in fact, the same. For Balibar, who here echoes Foucault’s 
The Order of Things, the invention of the ‘citizen’ appears intrinsically related to the 
unending conflict around the anthropological definitions of man, that is, with what 
Foucault identified as the structural impossibility of a purely transcendental ‘subject’ 
or ‘empirico-transcendental doubling’. Indeed, in retrospect, the insight of Foucault 
was to point to Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View as the flipside 
of the Critiques, as one of the most important quandaries of political modernity 
(Balibar, Citizen Subject, p. 300). 
 The Hegelian articulation between individual and collective subjects occupies 
the attention of three different essays in this volume. Balibar describes the famous 
formula of Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit, ‘Ich, das Wir, une Wir, das Ich ist’ 
or ‘(this) I that We are, (this) We that I am’ (IWWI) as a ‘centre of gravitation’ (p. 6) 
of the book. In Chapter 5, he retraces the roots of this Hegelian formula in two 
‘models of intersubjectivity’: a theological model of mutual inherence in the Gospel 
of John (pp. 134-5), and one of immanent association or ‘single-multiple person’ 
coming from Rousseau’s famous lines on the ‘social pact’ (pp. 136-7). In Chapter 7, 
‘Zur Sache Selbst: The Common and the Universal in Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit’, Balibar associates IWWI with another of Hegel’s famous formulas, ‘Tun aller 
und jeder’ (‘the action [or the operation] of all and each’ (p. 7)), which crystallizes the 
problem of collective praxis in Hegel’s Phenomenology. How does Hegel register the 
specific activity, operation, concrete effectivity, of the collective subject? How shall 
we grasp the ‘concrete universality’ of what Balibar calls ‘Being in common’ in Hegel, 
the effectivity of the ‘transindividual’ (pp. 156-7)? Balibar points us towards a middle 
path between two important post-Hegelian trajectories: a typically Sartrean 
conception of Hegelian praxis and a deconstructive interpretation in the terms of an 
‘inoperative community’ (Nancy, Bataille, Blanchot), one that stresses the rift 
between ‘community’ and ‘work’ (p. 155). Drawing on Jean Hyppolite, Balibar 
interprets the ‘thing’ (Sache) of Hegel’s Phenomenology aporetically: 
  
In reality, it seems to me that what Hegel wants to say is that the categories of 
‘real’ universality (value, exchange) as well as those of ‘symbolic’ universality 
(law, equality) both institute communities in which the difference between the 
part and the whole, the individual and the collective is mediated or relativized, 
and yet always fails to make this community into a living ‘individuality of 
individualities’ in which consciousness would no longer see anything in its 
own actions except the inner expression of a being in common conceived as a 





In Chapter 4, ‘From Sense Certainty to the Law of Genre: Hegel, Benveniste, 
Derrida’, Balibar explores the ‘subject’ of Hegel’s Phenomenology from yet another 
perspective: that of its performative constitution through enunciation. Following 
Jean-Claude Milner’s hypothesis that Émile Benveniste’s theory of personal 
pronouns was directly influenced by his reading of the chapter of the Phenomenology 
on sense certainty, Balibar highlights ‘a remarkable element of continuity between a 
segment of the dialectical tradition – albeit atypical – and structuralism’ (p. 113). In 
this famous chapter, enunciation is the locus of a contradictory experience, ‘the fact 
that each term paradoxically appears to be both absolutely singular and irremediably 
universal’ (p. 109).  As Balibar writes, Hegel ‘transforms sense certainty into a quasi-
subject – or better still, into a subjectless voice traversing all subjects that itself 
enunciates the paradoxes of uttering the “I”, the “Here”, and the “Now”’ (p. 110). 
Balibar unravels the theory of the subject contained in Benveniste’s theory of the 
conversion of language (langue) into individual discourse. Importantly, Balibar 
argues that Benveniste’s subject is not the individual interlocutor, but the twin, 
symmetric intercourse of ‘I and You’; in other words, Benveniste’s subject is already 
always a transindividual subject (p. 114). But whereas Hegel develops enunciation as 
a model of expropriation of the universal through language, for Benveniste first-
person enunciation is structurally underpinned by the appropriation of the totality of 
language (langue). In Monolingualism of the Other, Balibar comments, ‘Derrida 
proceeds to reflect upon the demonstrative value of his personal testimony, which 
exhibits in no uncertain terms the element of dispossession buried within his relation 
to a mother tongue that is both alienated and alienating’ (p. 107). Derrida’s reflections 
on the subject’s simultaneous appropriation and ex-appropriation of language thus 
provides a third term between Benveniste and Hegel. In addition to thinking the 
interface between the philosophy of enunciation and social ontology, Balibar’s 
triangulation sheds new light on Derrida’s intervention in linguistic structuralism, 
especially regarding the link between subject and structure (p. 113). 
It is also by relying on a theory of enunciation that Balibar reframes the 
problematic of universality in modernity. The enunciation of the universal, he 
explains, can both reveal a contradiction or conflict and manifest a difference; it 
brings to the fore the intrinsic dynamic of universality itself. This is the theme of the 
final chapter, ‘Bourgeois Universality and Anthropological Differences’, in which 
Balibar throws a retrospective glance at the essays comprising this volume, by 
providing a re-articulation of the Marxian critique of human rights and the post-
Kantian problematic of anthropological difference, a notion that he had already 
introduced in his Equaliberty. By ‘anthropological difference’, Balibar refers to the 
antithetical movement, in political modernity, between the invention of the notion of 
‘citizen’ (which repressed differences in the sphere of particularities), and the 
generalization of human classification in function of their difference. To address this 
chasm, Marx’s own critique of the bourgeois abstraction of human essence, and his 





[…] while Marx keeps a decisive critical distance from bourgeois universalism 
and naturalism, whose essentialist individualism (‘possessive’ as well as 
‘reflexive’) he denounces, he does not depart from its abstract representation 
of the human, making ‘relation’ (Verhältnis) into a generic activity that is 
fundamentally reciprocal and, in this sense, undifferentiated, even when it is 
presented as intrinsically conflictual. (p. 300, emphasis added) 
  
In order to supplement the limitations of Marx’s own philosophical 
anthropology, this concluding chapter goes on to stage the adventures of political 
universalism as a dialogical and conflictual encounter with its ‘missing voices’, the 
voices of the forgotten ‘subjects’ of political modernity:  
 
In their very singularity (because each voice is, precisely, that of a ‘subject’ or 
a subjectivation under determinate conditions), these voices demonstrate 
that the contradiction manifested in exclusions (and voiced by the excluded 
themselves) is exactly what allows universality to be ‘verified’ as such, because 
it prevents it from compromising on its principle and devolving into a more 
or less accommodating hegemony. Most of all, these voices show that the 
great ‘anthropological differences’ (whether it be sex, intelligence, ‘race’, or – 
as we will see – abnormality) are never simply a matter of particularity (nor 
of its defence of celebration in the form of ‘particularism’, to say nothing of 
‘communitarianism). They derive, on the contrary, from a conflict of 
universalities. (pp. 281-2) 
  
Under the heading of the ‘ill-being of the Subject’ (Malêtre du sujet), Balibar 
articulates a series of readings which attempt to flesh out the relationship between 
‘anthropology’ and ‘difference’ dialectically. His deconstructive dialectic nonetheless 
maintains that the relationship of difference to universality is not one of 
complementarity, but rather one of conflict and contradiction. Mary Wollstonecraft’s 
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) and Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin White 
Masks (1952) are not speaking ‘about difference, but they speak in difference (or out 
of difference) of the contradiction that it induces’ (p. 286). But apart from these 
exemplary cases, Balibar also conceptualises anthropological difference on the model 
of Foucault’s works on normality, abnormality and deviancy, as well as Freud’s and 
Butler’s works on sexual difference. These anthropological differences, he concludes, 
are not simply ‘constitutive of the human’; rather, ‘in their unstable multiplicity [they 
are] the only site where subjects can exist who raise the question, without preset 
answer, what it means to regard – or not regard – other subjects (who are also others 
as subjects) as human, and thus practically to confer on them an equal right to have 
rights’ (p. 301). In this philosophical anthropology moulded within the conjuncture, 
difference is not opposed to contradiction: on the contrary, it singularises, concretises 





A Symptomatic Reading: The Concept in Crisis 
 
The Concept in Crisis: Reading Capital Today came out of a 2015 conference 
commemorating the 50-year anniversary of Reading Capital. The volume is in large 
part guided by what Althusser calls a ‘symptomatic reading’, which, as Robert J.C. 
Young reminds us in his contribution, is a particularly difficult notion: not only does 
this term oscillate between epistemological, Freudian and Lacanian connotations, 
but is also the object of a singular mise-en-abîme in the text of Reading Capital, 
where Marx’s reading practices and the reading of Marx feed into one another. For it 
is by attributing the fatherhood of this approach to Marx that Althusser devises his 
own begotten son. Indeed, when making explicit the implicit problematics produced 
within the discourse of ‘political economy’ (particularly those of Adam Smith), Marx 
‘managed to read the illegible in Smith, by measuring the problematic initially visible 
in [Smith’s] writings against the invisible problematic contained in the paradox of an 
answer which does not correspond to any question posed’ (Althusser et al., Reading 
Capital, p. 27). Thus the pivotal importance of Marx’s method of symptomatic 
reading is that it ‘establishes the indispensable minimum for the consistent existence 
of Marxist philosophy’ (Althusser et al., Reading Capital, p. 33). Whereas the 
‘Marxist philosophy’ of Reading Capital was built upon a doubled symptomatic 
reading (Marx’s reading of Smith, Althusser’s reading of Marx), the gamble of Nick 
Nesbitt’s The Concept in Crisis is that a ‘tripled symptomatic reading’ opens up new 
avenues of theoretical production. As Knox Peden states,  
 
we can forgive it its infelicities, or its philological dubiousness. Above all we 
can concern ourselves less with the possibility that Althusser might be wrong 
about Marx. [...] But it is worth considering to what extent Althusser, in 
challenging the place of alienation in Marxist thought, and thereby quite 
possibly getting something about Marx wrong, may have gotten something 
else right.  (p. 86) 
        
Above all, the book is addressed to an anglophone readership, for whom the reception 
of Althusser has long been relatively detached from the (still understudied) field of 
French epistemology. Thus one of the book’s aims is to register an ongoing change in 
the reception of Reading Capital, in the light of recent English-language publications 
around the history of the French epistemological tradition, Spinozism and French 
rationalism (such as the recent works by Warren Montag, Knox Peden, Peter 
Hallward, Tom Eyers and others). From ‘ideology critique’, Reading Capital ‘is 
increasingly read’, Nesbitt writes, ‘as a culminating moment in the twentieth-century 
French tradition of epistemology that extends from Bachelard, Cavaillès, and Albert 
Lautman to Canguilhem, and Foucault and Althusser’ (p. 4).   
 The first part of the volume focuses on Althusser’s conception of method – 
not so much to thematise his use of a definitive ‘symptomatic’ or ‘structural’ method, 




J.C. Young examines the notion of repression at issue in Althusser’s notion of 
symptomatic reading: what type of unconsciousness (Bewusstlosigkeit) was 
Althusser after, exactly? Young argues that Althusser’s reading is in fact closer to the 
workings of processual and productive translation than to a Freudian 
symptomatology: ‘The symptomatic reading [...] is not at all Freudian reading in 
which symptoms are traced back to their explanatory cause, but a translation of the 
text forward in terms of the new concepts toward which it was working’ (p. 47) 
Following a similar line, Emily Apter even suggests that we grasp Reading Capital as 
an ‘event in the history of translation’ (p. 54), drawing on Althusser’s analyses of the 
relationships and gaps between various natural, formal, and diagrammatic languages 
as many ‘translative events’. 
 In his contribution, ‘The Althusserian Definition of “Theory”’, Alain Badiou 
travels into the past, reflecting on an unrealised collective project that Althusser, 
himself and others once envisaged (p. 34). They had planned to write a synthetic, 
pedagogic book about theory, ‘a sort of synthesis of [their] epistemological 
convictions’ (p. 25) around the idea of epistemological rupture and other key ideas. 
In this hypothetical opus, Badiou would have made a case for clarifying the 
distinctions between ‘concept’, ‘notion’ and ‘category’, in order to systematize the 
relationships between science, ideology and philosophy as different genres of 
discourse. The incomplete materialist epistemology of Althusser would have been at 
the centre of this project. For Badiou, the critical question posed by Althusserianism 
is that posed by theory: ‘By what mechanism does the process of knowledge, which 
takes place entirely in thought, produce the cognitive appropriation of the real object, 
which exists outside thought in the real world’ (p. 28)? This question, he claims, must 
be analysed in light of the effects of Althusser’s uncoupling of the dialectical 
opposition of theory and practice. Indeed, the reduction of theory to ‘theoretical 
practices’, its ‘adjectivization’, means that ‘theory’ ends up vanishing in its own 
circulation: ‘when you destroy the dialectical relationship, you produce the liberation 
of a word that is, finally, everywhere’ (p. 31). Badiou considers that ‘Althusser’s 
project to substitute a unified materialist vision of knowledge is paid for by a sort of 
adjectivization without limit’ (p. 31). Althusser’s rejection of the dialectical bind 
between theory and practice, Badiou concludes, led him to endorse a rather 
mysterious position between Kant’s transcendental schematism and Spinoza’s 
immanent materialism.  
 Étienne Balibar rereads Reading Capital with and against another major 
Marxist theorist of the early 1960s historical and theoretical conjuncture: Mario 
Tronti, the leading figure of ‘workerism’ (operaismo) in Italy, a tradition that, against 
the ‘relative autonomy’ granted to theory by Althusser, instead stressed the autonomy 
of politics – specifically the autonomy of working-class struggle – as the true locus of 
Capital’s theoretical discovery. Tronti’s Marx is thus more straightforwardly 
‘political’ than Althusser’s, insofar as ‘Tronti’s operaismo can be considered a rebirth 
of the “class against class” tactics’ (p. 98), situating the traditional arena of class 




labour and capital, but as the contemporary (early 1960s) meaning of ‘society’ itself. 
For Balibar, Tronti’s ‘factory’ is ‘the ultimate place where [...] political actors and 
strategies [confront] each other, [...] the place where the State qua “monopoly of 
power” is constituted, where the Leviathan is created’ (p. 107). In short, the factory 
is the metonym of capitalism itself; its destruction points to the potential destruction 
of capitalism itself. The differences between Althusser and Tronti are palpable, and 
Balibar demonstrates this through their divergent relationships to Lukács and 
Gramsci. Yet it is ultimately the shared ‘points of heresy’ between Althusser and 
Tronti that interests Balibar, because they enable us to identify the 1960s as a distinct 
political and intellectual conjuncture, one whose theoretical productivity has by no 
means been exhausted. It is worth recalling, as Balibar states, that ‘Althusser’s and 
Tronti’s theoretical productions in the early 1960s express the last moment in which 
communist discourse, combining “theory” and “politics”, was produced as such in a 
creative manner by party intellectuals, provided they gained or imposed some 
distance with respect to the official elaborations, while remaining attached to the 
organization’ (p. 97). In this way, whether it is their shared strategic decision to 
feature Marx’s analysis of the wage-form, or their commitment to revealing the 
locations and dislocations of capitalist ideology, the ‘affinities’ between Althusser and 
Tronti – which Balibar summarises as ‘antihistoricism, antihumanism, 
antieconomism’ (p. 108) – mark the early 1960s as singular conjuncture that 
attempted to ‘[bring] together politics and theory and the level of “grand” thinking’ 
(p. 109). Antihistoricism looms largest in Balibar’s account, because the rejection of 
historicism (the rejection of ‘vulgar’ linear, progressive time as the ‘motor of history’) 
is what secures the fact that the ‘conjuncture’ is, as we stated in the introduction, a 
complex ‘time of times’, a historical present that is non-contemporaneous with itself. 
Echoing Benjamin, this rejection, to which Althusser and Tronti were both 
committed, not only reveals that the true ‘“objects” for theory are […] conjunctures 
themselves’ (p. 105), but in so doing invigorates the theoretical and political potential 
of memory itself, releasing it from the suffocating straightjacket of commemoration. 
 Bruno Bosteels’ illuminating chapter, ‘Reading Capital from the Margins’, 
deserves considerable attention. It proceeds from Althusser’s position that the 
Marxian law of uneven development has no ‘exceptions’ (it does not ‘derive’ from any 
other law) and Balibar’s supplemental declaration that this law is thus primordial or 
‘primitive’ (p. 113). Bosteels takes these assertions to raise the question of what 
happens to the universality of this law when it is resituated in ‘other places, other 
styles, and other practices’ (p. 114) than those through which Althusser and Balibar 
articulate it. The purpose of posing this question, Bosteels asserts, is neither to 
‘provincialize Althusser’, along the lines of Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing 
Europe, nor to introduce an ‘Althusser at the margins’ (p. 115), such that the ‘true 
Althusser’ comes to light within the periphery. Rather, the question cuts to the heart 





To what extent does the logic of uneven development enable or disable the 
concrete analysis of other styles and other practices in those other places? Put 
differently, if we are in fact dealing with a tension, [...] a contradiction, it 
concerns not an external contrast between the wealth of empirical data in the 
periphery and the scarcity of conceptual frameworks coming from the centre, 
but a tension within the conceptual frameworks themselves – regardless of 
their geopolitical origin or particular site of enunciation. (p. 122) 
 
In other words, there is within Althusser’s figuration of uneven development a 
tension internal to the concept itself, between, on the one hand, its status as a 
‘universal’ or ‘primitive’ law, without exception, and, on the other hand, its 
dependence on specific social and historical conditions and thus on what is indeed 
‘exceptional’. Yet already by For Marx, Bosteels shows, ‘uneven development’ 
becomes transhistorical and transcendental – replaced by the ‘structural invariant’ of 
discrepancy/dislocation (décalage) – and therefore shorn of its particular historical 
and historicising bearings (pp. 123-4, 133). Thus for Althusser, ‘primitive internal 
unevenness’ comes to define the ‘Marxist’ or ‘materialist’ dialectic as such, insofar as 
it grounds the relationship between the overdetermined part and complex whole. The 
effect of this is that Althusser cannot account for the determinate conditions under 
which the complex structural whole produces what is ‘exceptional’, which is to say 
that – ironically – he cannot account for the very exceptions that enable this 
dependency of the exceptional on the invariant in the first place. The importance of 
the science of historical materialism is therefore thwarted by an insurmountable, a- 
and de-historicising obstacle (p. 131): the philosophy of the materialist dialectic, or 
‘dialectical materialism’. In short, Althusser falls on the wrong side of the very divide 
he created, between philosophy and science, in order to secure Marx’s theoretical 
revolution. 
 In Reading Capital, the primary register of this is the pride of place bestowed 
to the aforementioned concept of ‘discrepancy’ or ‘dislocation’ (décalage). After 
introducing Althusser’s understanding of the methodological, structural and 
historical dimensions of décalage, Bosteels contends that décalage does not 
illuminate the complex temporalities that infuse historical change:  
 
For all the insistence on discrepant temporalities as opposed to both the 
empty homogeneous time of bourgeois historiographies and the linear, 
teleological or developmentalist time of [...] ideological forms of Marxism, the 
affirmation of a radical principle of lag, dislocation, or discrepancy [...] does 
not seem to be any better equipped to address the complex time of history 
than Althusser’s hierarchical subordination of Marx’s science of history to a 
philosophical theory of structural causality. (p. 140) 
 
In sum, the principle of décalage simply does not clear up ‘the confusion that 




Errors of Classical Economics’ (Althusser et al., Reading Capital, p. 239), which, 
incidentally, Balibar states is ‘perhaps the most enduring philosophical achievement 
in Reading Capital’ (p. 104). For Bosteels, décalage does not adequately address, and 
in fact it exacerbates, the theoretical problems posed by ‘under-’ and ‘uneven 
development’, even if these categories of historical analysis do not offer the radical 
alternative that décalage does. Nonetheless, the dismissal of these problems leads us 
a point where ‘it [...] seems as though the time of history – like the hour of the finally 
determining instance of the economy – will never come’ (p. 141). 
 Yet Bosteels looks to Althusser’s work itself as a means of addressing the 
theoretical problems raised by unevenness, which is to say that ‘history develops 
unevenly, according to the different rhythms, times and turnovers of politics, 
ideology, science, art, philosophy, and so on’ (p. 144) What, Bosteels effectively asks, 
happens if we transpose Marx’s ‘symptomatic reading’, the fact that it ‘divulges the 
undivulged event in the text it reads’ (p. 142), to the terrain of history itself? In other 
words, does the concept of ‘symptomatic reading’ provide us with a logical model of 
grasping the ‘historical event’ as such, insofar as this concept registers an ‘irruption 
of the new within an existing structure’ (p. 142) that can be theoretically extended to 
all the places, styles and practices that are marked by unevenness, by history itself?  
 Bosteels joins this potential of symptomatic reading, which leads to a concept 
of the historical event itself, with an analysis of Althusser’s contribution to the theory 
of the subject. Whilst still acknowledging Althusser’s commitment to theoretical 
antihumanism, Bosteels declares that ‘the dislocation or discrepancy at the heart of 
any structure not only depends on the rare event of a structural mutation; such 
symptomatic appearances of the impasse within a given structure also do not become 
visible unless there is already a subject at work in doing the impossible, which is to 
pass through the impasse’ (p. 147). The need for a ‘minimal theory of the subject’ (p. 
147) – and hence of ‘subjection’ (assujettissement) and ‘subjectivization’ 
(subjectivation) – cannot be denied, because the décalage simply cannot ‘appear 
unless there is an intervening subject at work on [...] the site of an event where the 
historicity of the situation is symptomatically concentrated’ (pp. 148-9). The presence 
of a subject is hence the condition of attending to the historical problems raised by 
unevenness while at the same time preserving the rich grasp of historical time that 
Althusser’s reading of Marx provides.  
 We return now to the other ‘places, styles, and practices’ with which Bosteels' 
chapter begins. Responding to recent theories of the subject which seem to issue a 
‘primitive law’ in their own right, ‘applicable to any structure whatsoever’ (these 
theories stress the ‘constitutive excess’ of subjectivity, which is to say they revolve 
around the notion that ‘the subject always exceeds its own determination by the 
power structures that nonetheless bring it into existence in the first place’ [p. 149]), 
Bosteels implores us to instead undertake a ‘twofold historicization’ – first of 
different ‘modes of politics’, and second of multiple ‘theories of the subject’ (p. 151) – 
so as to open our eyes to historical unevenness and the possibilities of rupture it 




confrontation with capitalism, because it raises anew ‘the question of the historical 
emergence of capitalism out of the fortuitous encounter of factors that are themselves 
not capitalist but that subsequently come to be transcoded and reinscribed [...] as 
though they had been the result of capital itself’ (pp. 152-3). Suggestively, Bosteels 
transposes and reinscribes this question into the domain of political subjectivity 
itself, and detects a resemblance between this feature of capitalism and our 
understanding of modern subjectivity. As he articulates it: ‘the notion according to 
which a subject, though determined by circumstances that are not of its own making, 
can simultaneously transform both itself and its own circumstances, offers an 
uncanny replica of the loop whereby capital seems to posit the effective 
presuppositions of its own becoming, as though they were the products of its own 
doing’ (p. 153). In short, does the concept of the subject – particularly the 
‘transformative’ or ‘revolutionary’ modern subject – reproduce the very ahistorical 
and transcendental ruse of capitalism itself? If this is the case, how can we possibly 
think a ‘subject’ capable of overcoming capitalism, one that does not simply 
reproduce the conditions of its own becoming and intelligibility? The speculative 
answer, according to Bosteels, is sustained attention to the ‘breaks’ between modern 
and premodern, and therefore capitalist and precapitalist, economic and social 
formations. The theory of the subject ‘cannot afford to obliterate the historical 
markers that might separate, for instance, a Christian from a pre-Christian 
understanding of the self, or a capitalist from a pre-capitalist understanding of 
human speech and thought’ (p. 154). To put this another way: the revolutionary 
potential of the commune as a political subject is not realised by its modern forms 
(e.g., Paris, Chiapas) alone. Our memory of these forms must be doubled with the 
memory of their premodern antecedents. After José Carlos Mariátegui, this appeal to 
recollect an ‘archaic’ communal order is in no way a romantic desire for the recovery 
of a premodern utopia. Rather, it is an attempt to affect an intellectual, if not actual, 
conjuncture whose discordant temporalities cannot be re-presented by capitalism as 
products of its own doing.   
 Each in their own way, Warren Montag, Adrian Johnston, Nick Nesbitt and 
Fernanda Navarro provide us with a symptomatic reading of Reading Capital itself: 
Montag with his reading of Lacan as the primary interlocutor who guided the place 
of ‘absence’ in Althusser’s ‘structural causality’, Johnston with his revisitation of 
Althusser’s famous and controversial notion of Marx’s ‘epistemological break’ (the 
purported ‘rupture’ in Marx’s work in 1845, represented by The German Ideology), 
Nesbitt with his analysis of the ‘symptomatic status’ of Marx’s concept of ‘value’ in 
Reading Capital, and Navarro with her reflection on the political reverberations of 
Althusser’s work (namely in the Zapatista movement in Chiapas). Finally, Nina 
Power’s short chapter on the relationship between the theory of reading 
(symptomatic reading) offered by Reading Capital and the social reproduction of 
capitalism is particularly noteworthy: it raises new and thought-provoking questions 
for ‘social reproduction theory’, the interpretive framework of some of the most 





A Symptomatic Reading?: Marx’s Inferno 
 
We finish with William Clare Roberts’ Marx’s Inferno: The Political Theory of 
Capital, one of the most consequential works on Marx that appeared in 2017. It not 
only won the Deutscher Memorial Prize (the single significant English-language book 
prize for works in the Marxist tradition), but triggered a series of thoughtful 
exchanges, in the magazine Jacobin, between Roberts, on the one hand, and 
prominent Marx scholars David Harvey and Peter Hallward, on the other. It must be 
stated upfront that, unlike The Concept in Crisis, Marx’s Inferno is not presented as 
a ‘symptomatic reading’ of Capital. Indeed, it situates itself (p. 13) against the 
symptomatic reading offered by Reading Capital, not because it rejects this concept 
of reading as such, but because it endeavours to displace classical political economy 
(Smith and Ricardo) and philosophy (Hegel) as the exclusive objects of this reading. 
It does this because, for Roberts, Capital is first and foremost a work of political 
theory: the key interlocutors that catalysed Marx’s ‘theoretical revolution’ are not 
Smith, Ricardo or Hegel, but the patriarchs of nineteenth-century socialist discourse, 
figures whose writings animated and were animated by the contemporary workers’ 
movements in France and Britain: Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Charles Fourier, Henri 
de Saint-Simon, and Robert Owen. ‘I am convinced that Marx’s Capital is one of the 
great works of political theory,’ Roberts declares, because it ‘identifies and analyses 
an interrelated set of political problems that are either invisible to or wished away by 
virtually every other book in the canon of great works’ (p. 6). In this regard, if, as we 
stated in the introduction, one task of the contemporary conjuncture is to reanimate 
a political, not a philosophical, Marx, Roberts doubles down on this: Marx’s Inferno 
not only insists that Capital is fundamentally a ‘political document’ (p. 51), but that 
its status as a ‘great work’, and thus its relevance to the historical present, is only 
secured by this politicality.  
 Provocatively, Roberts maintains that the structural inspiration (p. 20) for 
Marx’s Capital is another ‘great work’, here of literature: Dante’s Inferno (the first 
part of his epic poem Divine Comedy). This does more than lend Marx’s Inferno its 
catchy title. It constitutes one of the two overriding arguments of the book: Capital 
was Marx’s self-conscious attempt to rewrite Dante’s Inferno ‘as a descent into the 
modern “social Hell” of the capitalist mode of production’, whereby Marx ‘cast 
himself as a Virgil for the proletariat, guiding his readers through the lower recesses 
of the capitalist economic order in order that they might learn not only how this 
“infernal machine” works, but also what traps to avoid in their efforts to construct a 
new world’ (pp. 1-2). Consistently exercising a degree of caution and conjecture, 
Roberts states that ‘Marx could have modelled Capital on the Inferno’ (p. 24), that 
‘Marx might […] have borrowed the plot of Dante’s Inferno in order to supply himself 
with an order for his exposition in Capital’ (p. 32), and that Capital is a 
‘recapitulation of Dante’s Inferno’ (p. 136) and an ‘appropriation of Dante’s schema’ 




and content of the chapters in Capital can be directly mapped onto the circles of hell 
(and thus cantos) in the Inferno, such that the famous opening three chapters in 
Capital, on commodity exchange and money, correspond to Upper Hell (the sins of 
incontinence) in the Inferno, those on capital in general and consequently 
exploitation correspond to Dis (the sins of violence), those on transformations within 
the production-process and accumulation to Malebolge (the sins of fraud), and finally 
the chapters on the ‘primitive accumulation’ of capital functioning as the self-
reflexive rewriting of Cocytus (the sins of treachery).  
 Despite this interpretive creativity, Roberts does not adequately substantiate 
his case for this structural homology (the limits of this reading have been raised in 
the multiple reviews, to date, of Marx’s Inferno): the evidence is clearly 
circumstantial, and comes at the expense of downplaying, if not omitting, other 
essential aspects of Capital. Yet even as this detracts from the overall persuasiveness 
of the book, it does not prevent us from highlighting its other substantial argument, 
namely that Capital is foremost a sustained critical confrontation with the theoretical 
stances and political aspirations of actually existing socialisms in the nineteenth 
century, that ‘Capital is best read as a critical reconstruction of and rejoinder to the 
other versions of socialism and popular radicalism that predominated in France and 
England in the 1860s and 1870s, when Marx was composing his magnum opus’ (p. 
2). Much more than the parallel reading of Marx and Dante, this is the real 
contribution of Marx’s Inferno. 
 In Chapter 3, Roberts appropriates the place of Akrasia (incontinence, lack of 
self-control and self-mastery, etc.) in Dante and transposes this to the ‘anarchic’ 
experience of everyday capitalist societies: the first three chapters of Capital are 
Marx’s attempt to reframe, qualify, and extend the idea that market-based societies 
cause people ‘to behave in an akratic manner’ (p. 57). Marx’s innovation in these 
chapters is his critical relocation of the source of Akrasia from individuals (the 
moralising discourses yoked to Akrasia by Dante and early socialist writers alike) to 
the impersonal domination of the market itself, of which individuals are merely the 
bearers or personifications. This is the basis for Marx’s rendition of money and value 
as generalised social domination against the Owenites and Proudhon, who hold out 
hope that exchange relations can be freed from money, and thus that commerce can 
be ‘reformed’ (p. 80). It is the basis of Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism, which 
Roberts demonstrates to be a locus of social domination, and thus a structural cause 
of Akrasia. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 restage Dante’s sins of violence (Dis) and fraud (Malebolge) 
within the terms of Marx’s analysis of the production-process of capital and 
transformations that this process entails. Roberts’ overriding concern is to illustrate, 
first, how Marx’s analysis of capitalist exploitation sets him off from the socialists 
Saint-Simon (who linked the exploitation of human beings to a transhistorical ‘failure 
of the strong to protect the weak, and with a consequent rule of force’ [p. 110]) and 
Proudhon (who understood exploitation as a remnant of feudalism, grounded in 




specific to capitalism: like the market, it is impersonal, it harnesses the productive 
powers of the human bodies in an unprecedented manner, and it is fuelled by an 
endless need for surplus labour. All of this presents a new mechanism of fraud, one 
that takes Proudhon’s positive portrayal of cooperation and association and redirects 
it towards a ‘threefold fraud inherent in the historical development’ (p. 164) of 
capitalism, a fraud that destroys workers’ lives as much as it develops their productive 
powers, and that is simultaneously expressed and hidden by the wage-form. The 
destruction wrought by this fraud is palpable, but it is also ‘the development of the 
material conditions of communism, for the simple reason that capitalism gives to the 
laboring classes a powerful motive to cooperate in the construction of a new society’ 
(p. 171).  In this sense, ‘the most important material condition of communism is the 
subjectively felt need for a new form of cooperative production’ (p. 184), which 
resonates, but ultimately departs from, Proudhon’s vision of emancipated society 
founded on reciprocity and mutuality.  
 Roberts brings his reading of Capital to a close with the declaration that the 
chapters on ‘primitive accumulation’ are ‘Marx’s attempt to conclude his argument 
against Proudhonism and similar forms of moralism within socialism’ (p. 189). 
Amongst other things, Roberts maintains that these chapters are driven by Marx’s 
desire to counter the ‘working-class separatism of the cooperative and mutualist 
movements’ (p. 190) widely espoused by Owenites such as William Thompson and 
social radicals like Bronterre O’Brien (p. 191). In short, Roberts says, ‘their fantasy of 
independence is wholly internal to the Hell they seek to escape’ (p. 192). The point is 
not to enable labour to create capital of its own, but to exit from capital and the 
political forms (i.e., states) that faithfully serve it (this is analogous to the passage 
through and out of the treachery of Cocytus).  
 Underlying this chapter on primitive accumulation, indeed Marx’s Inferno as 
a whole, is what Roberts calls Marx’s ‘obstetric conception of politics’ (p. 230), a 
concept of politics that is grounded by Marx’s well-known conviction that ‘new higher 
relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence 
have matured in the womb of the old society itself’ (p. 230). The question at hand is, 
of course, communism, not the Leninist one of how to get there, but the ‘prescriptive 
account of what communism ought to look like’ (p. 230). At this point Roberts paints 
his overarching picture of Marx’s political theory:  
 
The terms in which [Marx] criticizes capitalism reveal the principles 
according to which communist institutions would have to be [...] constructed 
and judged. Although Marx is widely read as a proponent of self-
determination or autonomy, his diagnoses of capitalism’s evils consistently 
point out forms of domination, not heteronomy. Hence, I read Marx as 
radicalizing the republican tradition for which freedom as non-domination is 
the highest virtue of institutions. Since Marx identifies novel forms of 
domination, his republic of labor looks unlike the republics advocated by 




of communist republics advocated by Robert Owen’s later works. I argue, 
therefore, that Marx should be appreciated both as a radical republican and 
an (admittedly heterodox) Owenite communist. (pp. 230-1) 
 
There is a great deal to unpack, even question, here, but the most essential 
task is to expand on Roberts’ view that Marx’s political theory is at heart a republican 
political theory, albeit one that significantly radicalises this tradition. The origin of 
this reading is Roberts’ use of what in political science is today known as ‘neo-
republicanism’ (or more specifically ‘neo-Roman republicanism’). Roberts is 
particularly guided by the theoretical works of Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit, 
whose ‘explication of republican freedom as non-domination tracks much more 
closely the range and types of Marx’s concerns than does the more traditional 
attribution to Marx of a positive conception of freedom as collective self-realisation 
or collective self-mastery’ (p. 7). Neo-republicanism is not the republicanism that is 
usually associated with the French revolutionary tradition (Jacobinism, Blanquism, 
etc.), and that is generally linked to Marx. Roberts’ neo-republicanism significantly 
downplays both individual and collective self-actualisation: freedom as defined by 
self-conscious, rational acts, and hence social relations as products of individual and 
collective wills. This is the conception of ‘freedom’ from which Roberts explicitly 
dissociates Marx (p. 248), because for Roberts it leads, amongst other things, to so-
called ‘cook shops of the future’ (p. 238), prescriptive accounts that dictate ‘what is 
to be done’ in post-capitalist societies. Marx, Roberts contends, is wary of these, and 
thus restricts his conception of freedom to non-domination: the solutions that any 
given emancipated association of laborers offers to their particular problems is up to 
them, not us, to decide; these solutions ‘will have to emerge out of the context of the 
problems themselves, and the institutions of freely associated people are their own 
affair, provided that no one is dominated’ (p. 238). Thus this is not the republicanism 
with which we are generally familiar – it is not a discourse on the virtues of citizenship 
(p. 242) – but rather one whose conditions capitalism only, albeit already, carries in 
its womb: ‘the institution of a global republic, or global federation of republics [...] 
[that] [...] would expand freedom to cover the whole breadth of depth of social life’ 
(p. 242). For these reasons, Roberts argues that Marx’s political theory is guided by a 
critical appropriation of Robert Owen’s political writings, and that this is the heart of 
Marx’s ‘self-conceived relation to the utopian socialist tradition’ (p. 244). Above all 
else, Owen’s vision of large-scale cooperative production as the condition of human 
emancipation inspires Marx’s ‘republic of labor’, a republic that is not free of ‘debate, 
deliberation, and disagreement’ (p. 253) – there will be politics – but that is 
nonetheless grounded by an association of free producers. This, in sum, is Marx’s 
‘republicanism in the realm of production’ (p. 251). It is the political-theoretical basis 







By way of a conclusion, it is worth raising the point that, like Reading Capital, Marx’s 
Inferno constitutes a ‘symptomatic reading of Marx’: its explicit rendition of Capital 
as a singular work of political theory, modelled, moreover, on Dante’s Inferno, 
provides in its own way ‘an answer which does not correspond to any question 
posed’. At another but related level, the publication of this book in 2017, 150 years 
after the first publication of Capital, is no coincidence. Roberts never references the 
anniversary, but the fact is that it amplifies, if not underlies, his claim that ‘in order 
to be properly appreciated, Marx’s Capital must be recovered as a work of political 
theory, written in a specific political context, but seeking also to say something of 
lasting importance about the challenges to – and possibilities for – freedom in the 
modern world’ (p. 1). In this sense, anniversaries function as seemingly inexhaustible 
wells of political desire for recovery. Yet if 2017 taught us anything, it is that the 
relationship between Marxism and modern European philosophy is constantly and 
necessarily open. Beyond the anniversary, the eternal return of ‘Marxist philosophy’ 
points to a persistent challenge for modern European philosophy: that of, for each 
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